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Preference Reversals Without the Independence Axiom 
By JAMES C. COX AND SETH EPSTEIN* 
The preference reversal phenomenon was believed to be inconsistent with the 
transitivity axiom of decision theory. However, recent papers have demonstrated 
that previously observed preference reversals could be explained by subject 
violations of the independence axiom or the compound lottery axiom. The present 
paper reports the results of experiments in which a substantial proportion of 
subject responses violate the asymmetry axiom. These results are inconsistent with 
expected utility theory and its generalizations. 
Economic theories of decision making un- 
der uncertainty imply consistency of choice 
and valuation that seems to be violated by a 
substantial percentage of subject responses 
in many experimental studies. This puzzling 
behavior has become known as the prefer- 
ence reversal phenomenon. A preference re- 
versal can be explained with the following 
example. A subject is offered a direct choice 
between two lotteries. One of the lotteries 
offers a high probability of a relatively small 
monetary payoff (hereafter referred to as the 
P or probability bet), and the other lottery 
offers a low probability of a relatively large 
monetary payoff (hereafter referred to as the 
$ or money bet). In addition, the subject's 
minimum selling price is elicited for each 
lottery. A preference reversal occurs when a 
subject places a lower selling price on the 
directly chosen lottery. Given that prefer- 
ences are monotone (more wealth or income 
is preferred to less), preference reversals were 
alleged to be inconsistent with the transitiv- 
ity axiom of decision theory.' 
David Grether and Charles Plott (1979) 
noted some possible problems in earlier ex- 
perimental designs for preference reversal 
experiments. Three of these were absence of 
salient monetary payoffs, lack of control for 
wealth effects, and absence of a possibility 
for subjects to record indifference.2 Grether 
and Plott designed some experiments that 
did not have the problems of earlier work. 
However, it was subsequently demonstrated 
by Charles Holt (1986) and Edi Karni and 
Zvi Safra (1987) that the Grether-Plott ex- 
perimental design cannot discriminate be- 
tween subject responses that are inconsistent 
with the independence axiom of expected 
utility theory and responses that are incon- 
sistent with more fundamental postulates of 
rationality such as transitivity. Furthermore, 
Uzi Segal (1988) showed that the Grether- 
Plott experimental design cannot discrimi- 
nate between violations of the transitivity 
and compound lottery axioms. Therefore, the 
Grether-Plott experimental results do not 
support their conclusion that subjects fre- 
quently violate transitivity. 
*Department of Economics, University of Arizona, 
Tucson, AZ 85721, and Department of Economics, 
DePaul University, Chicago, IL 60604-2287, respec- 
tively. We are grateful for financial support from the 
National Science Foundation under grant no. SES- 
8404915 and the Economic Science Laboratory of the 
University of Arizona. We have benefited from discus- 
sions with Brian Binger, Elizabeth Hoffman, Mark Isaac, 
Mark Machina, Ronald Oaxaca, Charles Plott, and 
Michael Ransom. We especially want to thank David 
Grether and an anonymous referee for comments and 
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'Grether and Plott (1979, p. 623) provide a detailed 
explanation of the "intransitivity" interpretation of the 
traditional preference reversal. 
2"Saliency" is one of the sufficient conditions ("pre- 
cepts") for conducting a valid controlled microeco- 
nomic experiment; these precepts are explained in Smith 
(1982). 
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In this paper, we present experimental de- 
signs that do not contain any compound 
lotteries and do not require the indepen- 
dence axiom to interpret the results. There- 
fore, any reversals of revealed preferences 
for lotteries that are observed in our experi- 
ments cannot be attributed to subject viola- 
tions of the compound lottery axiom or the 
independence axiom. In fact, the results of 
our experiments are that a substantial pro- 
portion of subject responses violate the 
asymmetry axiom. This type of reversal is 
inconsistent with expected utility theory and 
more general decision theories that relax the 
independence axiom. 
The design of our experiments, and the 
pattern of reversals that they produce, both 
differ in essential ways from previous prefer- 
ence reversal experiments. Thus we will refer 
to the reversals that we observe as "choice 
reversals," as distinct from the traditional 
preference reversal phenomenon.3 
I. Economic Theory and Experimental Design 
Economic theories of decision making un- 
der risk are concerned with choices among 
actions that yield outcomes that matter. This 
body of theory is not intended to explain 
how an agent might choose from among 
actions that yield consequences of no impor- 
tance to the agent. Therefore, the relevance 
to economics of experiments involving hypo- 
thetical choices can be questioned. In pre- 
ference reversal experiments, the critical 
distinction is between those experiments in- 
volving hypothetical choices among lotteries 
and those experiments involving real choices 
among lotteries such that the chosen lotteries 
are played and the resulting prizes (usually 
cash payoffs) are delivered to the subjects. 
Of course, it is an empirical question whether 
economically unmotivated choices are, in fact 
significantly different from economically mo- 
tivated choices.4 Nevertheless, the results of 
preference reversal experiments involving 
only hypothetical choices cannot provide a 
convincing challenge to economic theory. 
Economic theories 6f decision making un- 
der risk explain how variations in wealth can 
affect choices. Thus an agent with wealth w 
may prefer lottery A to lottery B but that 
same agent with wealth wi 0 w may prefer 
lottery B to lottery A. Therefore, the results 
of preference reversal experiments that allow 
a subject's wealth to change between choices 
cannot provide a convincing challenge to 
economic theory unless it can be shown that 
wealth effects cannot account for the results. 
Economic theories of decision making un- 
der risk provide explanations of optimal 
portfolio choice. Such theories explain why 
an agent might prefer lottery A to lottery B 
but prefer the portfolio (A, B) to the portfo- 
lio (A, A). If the portfolio is accumulated by 
sequential choice of A over B and then B 
over A, an apparent preference reversal could 
consist of choices that construct an agent's 
optimal portfolio. Therefore, the results of 
preference reversal experiments that allow a 
subject to accumulate a portfolio of lotteries 
cannot provide a convincing challenge to 
economic theory unless it can be shown that 
the resulting portfolio is dominated by an 
alternative feasible portfolio (by, say, first- 
order stochastic dominance). 
Expected utility theory is the most famil- 
iar economic theory of decision making un- 
der risk. An expected utility functional 
obtains its simple form of linearity in the 
probabilities as a consequence of the inde- 
pendence axiom. An experimental design 
that requires the independence axiom to in- 
terpret subject responses as preference rever- 
3One referee commented that the preference reversal 
phenomenon occurs when a subject chooses the P bet 
and places a higher selling price on the $ bet, and that it 
does not occur when a subject chooses the $ bet and 
places a higher selling price on the P bet. Another 
referee commented that the preference reversal phe- 
nomenon can only occur in experiments that use a 
(selling) price elicitation mechanism. 
4Grether and Plott in preference reversal experiments 
and David Grether (1980, 1981) in experiments on 
Bayes' rule have made important contributions in test- 
ing the effect of financial motivation on subject re- 
sponses. 
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sals can provide a convincing challenge to 
expected utility theory, but it cannot provide 
a challenge to more general decision theories 
that do not include the axiom. This point is 
important to evaluating the implications of 
earlier preference reversal experiments. In an 
attempt to get the subjects to reveal their 
certainty equivalents for the lotteries, re- 
searchers have commonly used the selling 
price elicitation procedure introduced in 
G. Becker, Morris DeGroot, and Jacob Mar- 
shak (BDM, 1964). In this BDM procedure, 
a subject states the minimum price at which 
he would sell a lottery. An offer to purchase 
is then selected randomly from some distri- 
bution (usually, a uniform distribution). If 
this offer exceeds the stated price, the subject 
sells the lottery for the amount of the offer; 
if the offer is below the stated price, the 
subject retains the lottery. The BDM proce- 
dure is designed to be a dominant strategy 
revelation mechanism. However, in prefer- 
ence reversal experiments the selling prices 
that are elicited are for lotteries. Since the 
BDM procedure is itself a lottery, its use in 
preference reversal experiments creates com- 
pound lotteries. The compound lottery and 
independence axioms allow one to "reduce" 
the compound lotteries and to interpret the 
elicited prices as certainty equivalents. But 
Karni and Safra (1987) have shown that the 
BDM procedure can elicit prices that are 
different from, and may be in reverse order 
to, the certainty equivalents of the respective 
lotteries if a subject's behavior does not sat- 
isfy the independence axiom. Furthermore, 
Segal has demonstrated that a similar rever- 
sal can occur if a subject's behavior does not 
satisfy the compound lottery axiom. There- 
fore, any preference reversal experiment that 
uses the BDM procedure cannot discrimi- 
nate between violations of the independence 
and compound lottery axioms and other, 
more problematic inconsistencies with deci- 
sion theory such as intransitivities. 
II. Earlier Experimental Work 
Preference reversal experiments were first 
reported in papers by Sarah Lichtenstein 
and Paul Slovic (1971, 1973) and Harold 
Lindman (1971). These experiments are part 
of a much larger group of experiments whose 
results have been interpreted as calling into 
question economic theories of rational choice 
(Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1983). Subsequent 
preference reversal experiments were re- 
ported by Grether and Plott, Werner Pom- 
merehne, Friedreich Schneider, and Peter 
Zweifel (1982), Robert Reilly (1982), and 
Joyce Berg, John Dickhaut, and J-ohn O'Brien 
(1985). All of these papers report interesting 
experiments. However, the generality of the 
implications for economics of all of their 
results can be questioned. 
Grether and Plott discussed preference re- 
versal experiments that preceded theirs; 
hence, we will begin our discussion with 
their paper. The Grether-Plott experimental 
design had the following properties. The sub- 
jects were divided into two groups. One 
group made hypothetical choices. The other 
group made real choices with salient mone- 
tary rewards. One of each subject's choices 
in the financially motivated group was ran- 
domly selected for cash payoff at the end of 
the experiment. This random selection pro- 
cedure was used to control for possible 
wealth and portfolio effects. In addition, the 
BDM procedure was used for both groups. 
Grether and Plott found a high proportion 
of preference reversals for both groups. Their 
experimental design can support a challenge 
to expected utility theory. But it cannot sup- 
port a challenge to more general decision 
theories that do not involve the indepen- 
dence axiom (Soo Hong Chew, 1981; Peter 
Fishburn, 1983; Mark Machina, 1982; 
Menahem Yaari, 1987). All of the Grether- 
Plott experiments used the BDM procedure. 
Therefore, their experimental design cannot 
discriminate between violations of the inde- 
pendence and compound lottery axioms and 
violations of transitivity for the reasons ex- 
plained by Karni and Safra (1987) and Segal 
(1988). Furthermore, as explained by Holt 
(1986), the Grether-Plott random selection 
procedure used in the experiments with cash 
payoffs also creates a compound lottery and, 
hence, an inability to discriminate between 
violations of the independence axiom and of 
transitivity. 
Pommerehne et al. addressed three poten- 
tial problems in Grether and Plott's experi- 
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mental design. First, they questioned whether 
the subjects were sufficiently motivated. This 
led them to increase the point (" play 
money") payoff by a factor of 100; however, 
the conversion rate of play money into cash 
was not known in advance by the subjects.5 
Second, Pommerehne et al. contended that 
nearly equal expected payoffs in Grether and 
Plott's P and $ bets could have resulted in 
subject boredom, effectively raising decision 
costs above expected return. This led them 
to run a set of experiments in which each 
lottery in a pair had a different expected 
value than the other. Finally, they ques- 
tioned whether inexperienced subjects un- 
derstood the random decision selection pro- 
cedure. This led them to provide their 
subjects with an opportunity to learn the 
mechanics of this procedure prior to making 
their final decisions. Their results indicated 
that preference reversal was robust. They 
failed to eliminate reversals, and only the 
first treatment, increased incentives, resulted 
in a significant reduction in their frequency. 
The description of the experimental design 
in Pommerehne et al. is inadequate for ascer- 
taining their actual procedures. They did 
write that "The design of our experiments is 
basically the same as that used by G-P" 
(Pommerehne et al., 1982, p. 571). We pre- 
sume that this statement means that they 
used the BDM and random selection proce- 
dures. Therefore, the implications of their 
results are limited to expected utility theory 
for the reasons explained by Holt, Karni and 
Safra, and Segal. 
Reilly also addressed the questions about 
possible insufficient incentives and subject 
confusion in the Grether-Plott (1979) experi- 
ments. He altered the design by increasing 
the dollar amounts at risk in the lotteries 
and by increasing the amount of instruction 
given to the subjects. Although their fre- 
quency was lowered, he found that prefer- 
ence reversals were still common. Reilly's 
experiments used the BDM procedure and 
the random decision selection procedure; 
therefore, the implications of his experimen- 
tal results are confined to expected utility 
theory. 
Berg et al. (1985) attempted to generate 
consistent choices from their subjects by an 
arbitrage procedure which forced them to 
engage in unprofitable trades if they made 
inconsistent decisions. This procedure suc- 
ceeded only in reducing the dollar amount of 
reversals, not their frequency. These experi- 
ments used the BDM procedure or a modi- 
fication of it (the O'Brien procedure) and the 
random decision selection procedure; hence 
the implications of the results are confined 
to expected utility theory. 
III. Experimental Designs 
Our experiments are designed to eliminate 
violations of the independence and com- 
pound lottery axioms as potential explan- 
ations for observed reversals of revealed 
preferences for lotteries. To do this, it is 
necessary to address the issues raised by 
Holt, Kami and Safra, and Segal. First, we 
simply abandon the random selection proce- 
dure and pay subjects for each decision. 
This, however, depending upon its imple- 
mentation, creates one of two other potential 
problems. If subjects are paid as each deci- 
sion occurs, wealth effects might exist, as 
money is accumulated between decisions. If 
no payment is made until after all decisions 
are made, portfolio effects might be a factor. 
That is, a consistent subject might prefer 
lottery A to lottery B and the portfolio (A, B) 
to the portfolio (A, A). This type of portfo- 
lio choice could appear to be a choice rever- 
sal. We decided to pay subjects after each 
choice and contend with possible wealth ef- 
fects as the lesser of two evils, recognizing 
that proceeding in this way was risky: if we 
found that wealth effects could explain most 
of the choice reversals then the experiments 
would not have produced any useful infor- 
mation. 
5This feature of the experimental design has some 
potential problems. Since a subject does not know the 
conversion rate of play money into cash but, presum- 
ably, has some expectations about it, yet another com- 
pound lottery has been created. In addition, the conver- 
sion rate depends on the choices of all of the subjects; 
hence there exists an uncontrolled externality among 
the subjects in cash rewards. 
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TABLE 1-THE Six LOTTERY PAIRS FOR THE DIRECT CHOICE QUESTIONS 
OF EXPERIMENT 1 
Probability Amount Amount Expected 
Pair Type of Winning If Win (Fr) If Lose (Fr) Value (Fr) 
1 P 35/36 4,000 -1,000 3,861 
$ 11/36 16,000 -1,500 3,847 
2 P 29/36 2,000 -1,000 1,417 
$ 7/36 9,000 - 500 1,347 
3 P 34/36 3,000 - 2,000 2,722 
$ 18/36 6,500 - 1,000 2,750 
4 P 32/36 4,000 - 500 3,500 
$ 4/36 40,000 -1,000 3,556 
5 P 34/36 2,500 - 500 2,333 
$ 14/36 8,500 -1,500 2,389 
6 P 33/36 2,000 - 2,000 1,667 
$ 18/36 5,000 -1,500 1,750 
Note: The lotteries used in the selling price questions are constructed by reducing every 
win and lose payoff amount in the table by 1,000 francs. 
Second, it was necessary that we not use 
the BDM price elicitation procedure. Fur- 
thermore, we concluded that Karni and 
Safra's Theorem 2 makes it highly unlikely 
that anyone will be able to design a price 
elicitation mechanism for choices in a lottery 
space that does not require the independence 
axiom. Therefore, we concluded that it would 
be impossible for us to elicit true selling 
prices in an experiment that is designed in 
such a way that behavioral inconsistencies 
with the independence axiom are not con- 
founded with more fundamental inconsisten- 
cies with decision theory. But preference 
reversals are inherently properties of incon- 
sistent orderings. The absolute magnitude of 
prices is basically irrelevant; it is the fact 
that the less preferred lottery is given a higher 
price that represents an inconsistency with 
decision theory. We utilized this fact by ask- 
ing subjects to state selling prices for both 
lotteries in every pair. They were informed 
that we would pay them an announced price 
of 1,000 francs for the lottery to which they 
had given the lower selling price, and they 
would play the lottery to which they had 
given the higher selling price. The payoffs for 
both lotteries in every pair were reduced by 
the amount of the announced price so that 
the subjects were choosing between the same 
probability distributions of returns in a sell- 
ing price question as in the paired direct 
choice question.6 In this manner we should 
preserve the ordering property of the stated 
selling prices despite the fact that we cannot 
elicit true selling prices. That is, a subject 
should still place a higher selling price on the 
lottery for which a direct preference is stated. 
If not, this represents a choice reversal. Since 
no compound lottery is created, the indepen- 
dence and compound lottery axioms are not 
involved. 
A. Experiment 1 
In experiment 1 we presented subjects with 
essentially the same six pairs of lotteries 
used by Grether and Plott and by Lichten- 
stein and Slovic (1971, experiment 3). Table 
1 reports the lotteries that we used in the 
direct choice questions. These are the same 
as the Lichtenstein and Slovic lotteries ex- 
cept that our "franc" payoffs are ten times 
their "point" payoffs. Our exchange rate be- 
tween francs and U.S. dollars was 4,000 to 1. 
This exchange rate implies dollar payoffs 
6 Note that the consequences of placing a higher 
price on the $ bet (P bet) in a selling price question are 
exactly the same as the consequences of choosing the $ 
bet (P bet) in the paired direct choice question. This 
would not be the case if we had failed to reduce the 
lottery payoffs by 1,000 francs in the selling price ques- 
tions. 
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that are 1/4 the dollar payoffs in the 
Grether-Plott lotteries. This reduction in dol- 
lar payoffs was necessitated by budgetary 
considerations since we paid subjects for each 
decision whereas Grether and Plott selected 
only one of eighteen decisions for cash pay- 
off. 
The lotteries were presented to our sub- 
jects in the form of figures like those in the 
Grether and Plott experiments. Some repre- 
sentative figures from our experiments are 
contained in the Appendix. A bingo cage 
containing balls numbered 1-36 was used to 
generate random numbers. Subjects were in- 
formed that for each lottery, if the number 
drawn was less than or equal to x, they 
would win a set amount of francs, and if the 
number drawn exceeded x, they would lose 
a specified number of francs. The exchange 
rate between francs and dollars was clearly 
specified in the instructions. 
Inspection of Table 1 reveals that there 
are only small differences between the ex- 
pected payoffs for the P and $ bets in every 
pair; in fact, using the 4,000 francs to $1 
conversion rate, these differences only vary 
from one cent to two cents. The differences 
between the expected payoffs in the paired P 
and $ bets used by Grether and Plott (1979, 
p. 629) varied from one cent to eight cents. 
However, the probability that any one deci- 
sion would be selected for cash payoff in the 
Grether-Plott experiment was 1/18. Hence, 
in order to calculate the actual expected 
payoffs to their subjects, one needs to divide 
their expected lottery payoff figures by 18. If 
one does that, and then rounds to the near- 
est cent, one finds that the P and $ bets in 
four of their lottery pairs had the same ex- 
pected payoff and there was a one-cent dif- 
ference in the other two pairs. Therefore, in 
both our experiment 1 and the Grether-Plott 
experiments, a risk-neutral subject would in- 
cur a very small reduction in expected utility 
from reversals. In order to increase the ex- 
pected opportunity cost of choice reversals 
for any subjects who might be risk neutral, 
we designed a second experiment with larger 
separations of expected lottery payoffs. 
B. Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was designed in the same 
way as experiment 1 except that the lotteries 
were different. Table 2 presents the lotteries 
that we used in the direct choice questions of 
experiment 2. The Table 2 lotteries were 
constructed from those in Table 1 by in- 
creasing the win state payoff for one lottery 
in each pair by an amount that yielded about 
a 50 percent difference between the expected 
payoffs for the paired lotteries. We alter- 
nated between $ and P bets in increasing 
the expected payoffs. Thus, in pair 1 (Table 
TABLE 2-THE Six LoTTERY PAIRS FOR THE DIRECT CHOICE QUESTIONS 
OF EXPERIMENT 2 
Probability Amount Amount Expected 
Pair Type of Winning If Win (Fr) If Lose (Fr) Value (Fr) 
1 P 35/36 4,000 -1,000 3,861 
$ 11/36 22,400 -1,500 5,803 
2 P 29/36 2,800 - 1,000 2,061 
$ 7/36 9,000 - 500 1,347 
3 P 34/36 3,000 - 2,000 2,722 
$ 18/36 9,200 -1,000 4,100 
4 P 32/36 6,100 - 500 5,367 
$ 4/36 40,000 -1,000 3,556 
5 P 34/36 2,500 - 500 2,333 
$ 14/36 11,400 -1,500 3,517 
6 P 33/36 3,100 - 2,000 2,675 
$ 18/36 5,000 -1,500 1,750 
Note: The lotteries used in the selling price questions are constructed by reducing every 
win and lose payoff amount in the table by 1,000 francs. 
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2) the $ bet has an expected value that is 
about 50 percent higher than the P bet, 
whereas in pair 2 the P bet's expected value 
is about 50 percent higher than the $ bet's 
expected value, and so on in an alternating 
pattern. These differences between expected 
values for paired P and $ bets vary from 714 
francs (18 cents) to 1,942 francs (49 cents). 
IV. Experimental Procedures 
Subjects were recruited from undergradu- 
ate economics classes at the University of 
Arizona. Only one subject at a time partici- 
pated in an experiment to avoid the possibil- 
ity of an agent's decisions being influenced 
by others' wins, losses, or decisions. Each 
subject was permitted to ask questions for 
clarification. As each person entered the 
room, he or she was presented with a set of 
written instructions which explained the na- 
ture of the lotteries and the decisions to be 
made. All 36 balls were outside the bingo 
cage for inspection and the subject would 
place them into the cage for himself or her- 
self. Twelve figures accompanied the instruc- 
tions, each depicting a pair of lotteries. The 
instructions and some of the figures for ex- 
periment 2 are contained in the Appendix. 
Each subject made decisions over the six 
pairs of lotteries twice. One of the times a 
direct preference was stated, and the subject 
immediately played the chosen lottery; the 
other time selling prices were given, and the 
subject played the lottery for which a higher 
price was stated.7 The lower-priced lottery 
was sold to the experimenter for a set fee of 
1,000 francs (25 cents), regardless of the 
actual quoted price. Once again, this permit- 
ted us to elicit selling prices which would be 
ordered the same as the true prices without 
the necessity of eliciting the true prices. 
Sequential decisions over any pair of lot- 
teries were always separated by six re- 
sponses. That is, if a subject stated a direct 
preference for lottery A or B in decision one, 
he would state selling prices for the same 
pair of lotteries in decision seven. Two and 
eight were similarly related, as were three 
and nine, and so on. The questions were 
posed in an alternating fashion; if prefer- 
ences were given in period t, then prices 
were elicited in period t + 1. Half the sub- 
jects (Group I) began by stating preferences 
and the other half (Group II) began by 
stating prices. Therefore, for each pair of 
lotteries, half the subjects stated preferences 
prior to selling prices and half responded in 
the reverse order. 
V. Results 
Thirty subjects participated in each of the 
two experiments. All 60 subjects were dis- 
tinct individuals. Each subject was given 
$5.00 (or 20,000 francs) in working capital to 
cover possible losses in the lotteries. In ex- 
periment 1, individual subject payoffs from 
playing the chosen lotteries varied from $3.25 
to $13.75. The average subject lottery payoff 
was $7.28; hence the average total subject 
payoff in experiment 1 was $12.28. Individ- 
ual subject payoffs from the lotteries chosen 
in experiment 2 varied from $4.25 to $25.75. 
The average subject payoff from the lotteries 
in experiment 2 was $10.02 and, hence, the 
average total subject payment in this experi- 
ment was $15.02. On average, a subject took 
21 minutes to complete experiment 1 and 23 
minutes to complete experiment 2. 
A. Frequency of Choice Reversals 
Table 3 reports a summary of the results 
from both experiments. There were three 
choices of "indifferent" in experiment 1. In 
the other 177 decision pairs of experiment 1, 
62 (or 35 percent) were reversals. In experi- 
ment 2, 258 of 360 (or 72 percent) of the 
subject's responses implied selection of the 
bet with higher expected payoff in each pair. 
Even so, 52 of 180 (or 29 percent) of the 
decision pairs in experiment 2 were reversals. 
In experiment 1, 26 of the 30 subjects, or 87 
percent, reversed at least one time. Of the 30 
subjects in experiment 2, 24 (or 80 percent) 
reversed at least one time. 
7If a subject reported indifference between two bets 
or set equal selling prices on two bets, then the one he 
or she would play was determined by a coin toss. 
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TABLE 3- SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS 
Total Consistent Inconsistent 
Group Decisions Decisions Decisions Indifference 
Experiment 1 
I 90 52 35 3 
II 90 63 27 0 
I+II 180 115 62 3 
Experiment 2 
I 90 69 21 0 
II 90 59 31 0 
I+II 180 128 52 0 
B. Analysis of Possible Wealth Effects 
Subjects in our study were accumulating 
money from lottery payoffs during our ex- 
periments. This could produce wealth effects 
on subject choices over lotteries. We could 
not control for possible wealth effects with- 
out using the Grether-Plott random decision 
selection procedure that confounds viola- 
tions of the independence and compound 
lottery axioms with other sources of choice 
reversals. Therefore, we have examined the 
data in several ways to determine whether 
wealth effects can explain the results. 
Define the following variables: 
1 if subject selected the $ bet in 
D = i period t, 
A if subject selected the P bet in 
period t; 
TW,_ = total wealth at the end of 
period t-1. 
Logit analyses, using various subsamples of 
the data, were done to relate the probability 
that Dt =1 (rather than 0) to TW,>1 and 
Dt-6 (the binary variable for the previous 
selection from the same lottery pair). If no 
reversals occurred there would be perfect 
correlation between D, and D,_ 6 because 
subjects faced the same (although slightly 
"disguised") lotteries in periods t and t -6. 
A significant coefficient on TW,_ 1 would 
indicate a statistical relationship between 
subject choice and wealth, and indicate a 
confounding of wealth effects with inconsis- 
tent revealed preferences. Table 4 reports the 
logit coefficients and t-ratios (in parentheses) 
for the first set of estimations. 
First consider the results for the experi- 
ment 1 data. The second column of Table 4 
reports the pooled sample estimation.8 There 
is clearly a significantly positive relation be- 
tween decisions in period t and t - 6 (at any 
reasonable confidence level) despite the ob- 
servance of 35 percent reversals. The wealth 
coefficient is barely significant at the 10 per- 
cent confidence level (actually, at a = 0.091). 
The third and fourth columns report the 
results for the subject Group I and Group II 
subsamples. Group I data are for those sub- 
jects who began by stating a direct prefer- 
ence whereas Group II subjects began by 
stating prices. Both groups show highly sig- 
nificant relations between decisions over the 
same pair of lotteries, yet neither group ex- 
hibits significant wealth effects at the 10 
percent confidence level. 
8 
All 180 observations, including those three in which 
subjects did not indicate a strict preference between the 
two lotteries are used. Two of the three are statements 
of "Do not Care" when direct preference was given, 
and one is a statement of identical selling prices. None 
of the three is consistent with the theory; the decision 
over the same pairs of lotteries when asked in the 
opposite fashion is a specific choice of one lottery over 
the other in each of the three cases. For this reason, the 
dummy variable D,(D,-6) takes the value of 1 when 
D,_6(D,) has the value 0, and D,(D,_6) takes the value 
0 when D,_6(D,) has the value 1. 
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TABLE 4-TESTS FOR WEALTH EFFECTS 
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
Design Pooled Pooled 
Determinants Sample Group I Group II Sample Group I Group II 
TW,_, l 0.0000272 0.0000232 0.0000272 0.0000138 0.0000163 0.0000141 
(1.689) (0.959) (1.18) (1.363) (0.842) (1.223) 
D, _ 6 1.33 0.975 1.692 1.768 2.422 1.238 
(4.113) (2.11) (3.603) (5.333) (4.708) (2.752) 
ln L -114.61 - 59.970 - 53.973 -107.15 - 48.492 - 56.948 
- 21n X 20.119 4.782 16.643 34.430 27.383 10.471 
20.95 5.99 5.99 5.99 5.99 5.99 5.99 
N 180 90 90 180 90 90 
Note: Notation in the table is defined as follows: L is the value of the likelihood 
function; X is the likelihood ratio under the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients 
are jointly zero; - 21n X is distributed as a chi square with two degrees of freedom; 
X2 05is the critical value of the chi square variate at the 95 percent confidence level 
with two degrees of freedom; and N is the number of observations. The figures in 
parentheses are t-ratios. 
TABLE 5-TESTS FOR WEALTH EFFECTS IN INDIVIDUAL DECISION PAIRS 
Subsamples 
Design Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair 
Determinants (1,7) (2,8) (3,9) (4,10) (5,11) (6,12) 
Experiment 1 
TW,-1 0.0000359 - 0.00000172 - 0.0000510 0.0000991 0.00000706 0.0000906 
(0.844) (-0.039) (-1.129) (1.756) (0.173) (1.442) 
D, _ 6 0.5010 1.413 1.029 2.713 0.4387 2.772 
(0.603) (1.785) (1.214) (2.147) (0.530) (2.270) 
ln L - 17.786 - 18.793 - 17.569 - 13.151 - 19.554 - 14.777 
-21nX 1.0793 3.4676 3.0528 6.2949 0.32200 7.0972 
x20.95 5.99 5.99 5.99 5.99 5.99 5.99 
N 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Experiment 2 
TW,_ l 0.0000236 0.0000264 0.000157 - 0.0000468 0.0000413 0.0000321 
(0.760) (1.007) (1.343) (-0.773) (1.122) (1.298) 
D, - 6 1.209 0.300 2.901 3.398 0.992 0.457 
(1.501) (0.318) (1.759) (1.770) (1.089) (0.549) 
ln L -18.794 - 18.382 - 10.071 - 5.342 - 14.985 - 17.135 
- 21n X 4.001 1.427 6.8908 4.011 2.625 2.382 
x2'095 5.99 5.99 5.99 5.99 5.99 5.99 
N 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Note: Notation in this table is defined in Table 4. 
The last three columns of Table 4 report 
logit estimations for experiment 2. All of 
the D - 6 coefficients are highly significant 
whereas none of the wealth coefficients is 
significant at the 10 percent confidence level. 
The preceding estimates are based on data 
that are aggregated over decision pairs. The 
results of logit estimations of the data from 
individual decision pairs are reported in 
Table 5. For experiment 1, pairs (2,8), (4,10), 
and (6,12) show significantly positive rela- 
tionships between decisions in period t and 
decisions in period t - 6 (at 10 percent con- 
fidence level for (2,8) and 5 percent confi- 
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dence level for (4,10) and (6,12)). As one 
would expect, these represent the three deci- 
sion pairs for which subjects made the fewest 
reversals. In the (2,8) pair, 10 of 30 subjects 
reversed choices. In the (4,10) pair, this pro- 
portion dropped to 7 of 30, and in the (6,12) 
pair it was 6 of 30. Only one wealth coeffi- 
cient, that for the (4,10) pair, is significant at 
10 percent. This is noteworthy because this 
one indication of significant wealth effects 
occurs in the decision pair where observed 
reversals are at their next-to-lowest propor- 
tion of any of the six decision pairs. No 
other decision pair shows any significant re- 
lationship between choice and wealth. 
The experiment 2 results in Table 5 reveal 
the following. Only pairs (3,9) and (4,10) 
have significantly positive relationships be- 
tween decisions in period t and t -6 at the 
10 percent confidence level. These are the 
decision pairs for which subjects made the 
fewest reversals: 5 of 30 subjects reversed 
choices in (3,9) and 2 of 30 subjects reversed 
in (4,10). There is no significant wealth co- 
efficient at 10 percent confidence level for 
any decision pair in experiment 2. 
The logit analyses reported in Tables 4 
and 5 detect little in the way of significant 
wealth effects on subject decisions. But these 
estimations aggregate subject responses. Per- 
haps there are significant wealth effects that 
are not homogeneous across subjects. If one 
looks at the order of decision and ignores 
the type of question (selling price or direct 
choice), there are two categories of choice 
reversals. One category consists of those in- 
stances in which a subject initially selects the 
P bet and then (six decisions later) selects 
the $ bet in the paired decision. This cate- 
gory of inconsistent decisions will be re- 
ferred to as P$ reversals. The other category, 
$P reversals, consists of those instances in 
which a subject first selects the $ bet and, 
subsequently, selects the P bet in the paired 
decision. Since in almost all cases a subject 
had earned several dollars between the first 
decision in a pair and the second, perhaps 
the P$ ($P) reversals can be explained by 
consistent subject preferences that exhibit 
decreasing (increasing) risk aversion. Tests 
such as those reported in Tables 4 and 5, 
that aggregate across P$ and $P reversals, 
may fail to detect wealth effects because in 
the aggregate they are offsetting. 
One cannot credibly argue that the same 
subject exhibits both decreasing and increas- 
ing risk-averse preferences for the wealth 
changes in our experiments. Therefore, one 
cannot simply count the total number of 
reversals of each type, but must examine the 
pattern of reversals for each subject. If a 
subject makes both P$ and $P reversals, 
then the decisions are inconsistent with both 
increasing and decreasing risk aversion and 
such wealth effects cannot immunize the the- 
ory to the falsifying evidence. First consider 
the individual subject results for experiment 
1. If we consider only those subjects that 
make P$ or $P reversals, but not both types, 
we find 19 P$ reversals and 6 $P reversals. 
These are accounted for by 9 subjects who 
make only P$ reversals and 4 subjects who 
make only $P reversals. There are 13 sub- 
jects who make both types of reversals and 4 
subjects who do not reverse. Table 6 reports 
logit analyses of the subsamples of the data 
for the 9 subjects who make only P$ rever- 
sals and the 4 subjects who make only $P 
reversals in experiment 1. The t-ratios in 
parentheses do not indicate that wealth ef- 
fects are significant for either group of sub- 
jects. 
Next, consider the individual subject re- 
sults for experiment 2. If we consider only 
those subjects that make P$ or $P reversals, 
but not both types, we find 9 P$ reversals 
and 6 $P reversals. These are accounted for 
by 7 subjects who make only P$ reversals 
and 5 subjects who make only $P reversals. 
There are 12 subjects who make both types 
of reversals and 6 subjects who do not re- 
verse in experiment 2. The experiment 2 
results in Table 6 report logit analyses of the 
subsamples of the data for the 7 subjects 
who make only P$ reversals and the 5 sub- 
jects who make only $P reversals. The t- 
ratios in parentheses do not indicate that 
wealth effects are significant for either group. 
We interpret the results of all of these 
logit analyses as follows. Changes in subject 
wealth during our experiments may have af- 
fected subject decisions. However, any such 
wealth effects cannot account for either the 
frequency or the pattern of subject choice 
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TABLE 6-TESTS OF WHETHER INCREASING OR DECREASING RISK AVERSION 
CAN EXPLAIN CHOICE REVERSALS 
Design Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
Determinants P$ Reversers $P Reversers P$ Reversers $P Reversers 
TW,_, I0.00000628 -0.0000398 0.0000443 0.00000218 
(0.150) (-0.342) (1.032) (0.057) 
D,_ 6 14.292 15.157 3.796 17.595 
(0.045) (0.026) (3.207) (0.013) 
ln L - 23.320 - 8.2584 -18.221 - 10.094 
-21nX 17.171 10.475 19.378 16.465 
2,0.95 5.99 5.99 5.99 5.99 X2' 
N 54 24 42 30 
Note: Notation in this table is defined in Table 4. 
reversals. True reversals of revealed lottery 
preferences are an important feature of our 
subjects' decisions. 
If wealth effects cannot explain the rever- 
sals then, perhaps, subject inexperience can. 
Perhaps our subjects were learning about the 
lotteries during the experiment and this 
learning process can account for the rever- 
sals. We will next examine this question. 
C. Analysis of Possible Outcome Effects 
It is possible that some subjects did not 
fully understand the lotteries at the begin- 
ning of the experiment. For example, an 
initial selection of the $ (long shot) bet, 
followed by an unlucky outcome (a loss), 
might cause a subject to avoid the $ bet in 
the subsequent paired decision. In experi- 
ment 1 we observed 24 instances of subjects 
that exhibited $P reversals, and 53 instances 
where selection of the $ bet was consistently 
followed by the same selection six periods 
later. Of the 24 reversals, 20 (or 83 percent) 
involved a loss when the $ bet was played. In 
contrast, subjects lost only 29 out of 53 (or 
55 percent) of the first plays of the $ bet in 
those cases where they did not reverse in 
experiment 1. Any effects of lottery out- 
comes on subsequent decisions, unless they 
are wealth effects, are incompatible with de- 
cision theories that assume well-defined risk 
preferences. However, they could also indi- 
cate that the reversals are attributable to 
subject inexperience with the lotteries and 
therefore that the frequency of reversals 
might decrease significantly with more sub- 
ject experience. 
We performed the logit estimations that 
are reported in Table 7 to test for possible 
paired lottery outcome effects on subsequent 
decisions. These estimations used the deci- 
sion (D, 6) and wealth (TW>-1) variables 
defined above and the outcome variable de- 
fined as follows. 
{1 if subject received the high 
OUTCMt= 6 payoff 
in period t -6, 
t if subject received the low 
OU M t = payoff in period t - 6. 
Table 7 reports the pooled sample and group 
results of the estimations for both experi- 
ments. In all columns, the coefficient on the 
paired decision variable (D- 6) is highly sig- 
nificant. However, none of the coefficients 
on the paired outcome (OUTCMt_6) and 
wealth (TWt>1) variables is significant at the 
10 percent confidence level. Similar estima- 
tions for individual decision pairs of both 
experiments are reported in Table 8. None 
of these coefficients on paired outcome is 
significant at the 10 percent confidence level. 
We conclude that paired lottery outcome did 
not significantly affect the subjects' lottery 
choices. 
It might not be outcome in the paired 
decision that could affect lottery selection 
but, instead, outcome in the immediately 
This content downloaded from 131.96.28.172 on Mon, 11 Jan 2016 19:02:27 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
VOL. 79 NO. 3 COXAND EPSTEIN: PREFERENCE REVERSALS 419 
TABLE 7-TESTS FOR PAIRED PERIOD OUTCOME FFECTS 
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
Design Pooled Pooled 
Determinants Sample Group I Group II Sample Group I Group II 
TW,_i 0.0000197 0.0000192 0.0000169 0.0000131 0.0000177 0.0000105 
(1.131) (0.769) (0.658) (1.239) (0.900) (0.864) 
OUTCMt 6 0.5719 0.4269 0.7163 0.1105 -0.3305 0.5451 
(1.144) (0.633) (0.952) (0.220) (-0.425) (0.818) 
DI - 6 1.659 1.244 2.083 1.840 2.197 1.583 
(3.735) (1.948) (3.229) (3.917) (3.011) (2.524) 
ln L -113.93 - 59.764 - 53.499 -107.13 - 48.404 - 56.604 
-21nX 21.481 5.1949 17.590 34.479 27.559 11.158 
x2,0.95 7.81 7.81 7.81 7.81 7.81 7.81 
N 180 90 90 180 90 90 
Note: L, X, and N are defined in Table 4. Other notation in this table is defined as 
follows. - 21n X is distributed as a chi square with three degrees of freedom; X3095 is 
the critical value of the chi square variate at the 95 percent confidence level with three 
degrees of freedom. 
TABLE 8-TESTS FOR PAIRED PERIOD OUTCOME EFFECTS IN INDIVIDUAL 
DECISION PAIRS 
Subsamples 
Design Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair 
Determinants (1,7) (2,8) (3,9) (4,10) (5,11) (6,12) 
Experiment 1 
TW,1 0.0000287 - 0.00000210 - 0.0000606 0.000129 - 0.0000255 0.0000807 
(0.545) (-0.043) (-1.228) (1.941) (- 0.520) (1.247) 
OUTCM,-6 0.3802 0.0194 0.8197 -2.364 13.863 0.7792 
(0.233) (0.018) (0.517) (-1.451) (0.033) (0.711) 
DI,- 6 0.7245 1.424 1.5641 1.089 13.338 3.049 
(0.573) (1.430) (1.123) (0.701) (0.031) (2.331) 
In L - 17.759 - 18.793 - 17.427 - 12.182 - 17.482 - 14.522 
- 21n X 1.1336 3.4679 3.3377 8.2322 4.4656 7.6069 
20.95 7.81 7.81 7.81 7.81 7.81 7.81 
N 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Experiment 2 
TW,1 0.0000733 0.0000321 0.000138 -0.0000324 0.0000458 0.0000347 
(1.318) (1.192) (1.166) (-0.474) (1.037) (1.313) 
OUTCM,-6 -2.500 -1.400 12.429 -0.9394 13.219 -0.9048 
(-1.231) (-0.924) (0.019) (-0.418) (0.024) (-0.659) 
D,-6 -0.7505 -0.6913 14.968 3.022 13.774 -0.1803 
(- 0.429) (- 0.471) (0.023) (1.442) (0.025) (- 0.138) 
ln L - 17.897 - 17.898 - 9.612 - 5.266 - 13.770 - 16.903 
-21nX 5.794 2.394 7.809 4.164 5.057 2.846 
020.95 7.81 7.81 7.81 7.81 7.81 7.81 
N 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Note: L, X, and N are defined in Table 4. Other notation in this table is defined in 
Table 7. 
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TABLE 9-TESTS FOR PREVIOUS PERIOD OUTCOME FFECTS 
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
Design Pooled Pooled 
Determinants Sample Group I Group II Sample Group I Group II 
TWt,> 0.00003185 0.00003518 0.00002525 0.0000121 0.0000137 0.0000129 
(1.883) (1.370) (1.064) (1.178) (0.697) (1.103) 
OUTCM,_l -0.359755 -0.802385 0.169015 0.4085 0.3784 0.3768 
(-1.050) (-1.675) (0.333) (1.164) (0.705) (0.797) 
Dt,- 6 1.30221 0.960542 1.71865 1.817 2.449 1.296 
(4.007) (2.054) (3.596) (5.384) (4.711) (2.821) 
In L -114.05 - 58.527 53.917 -106.47 - 48.241 - 56.627 
-21nX 21.227 7.6672 16.754 35.802 27.885 11.113 
2,0.95 7.81 7.81 7.81 7.81 7.81 7.81 X3 
N 180 90 90 180 90 90 
Note: L, X, and N are defined in Table 4. Other notation in this table is defined in 
Table 7. 
preceding period. To test for this possibility, 
we performed the logit estimations reported 
in Table 9. These estimations used the out- 
come variable defined as follows. 
{ 1 if subject received the high 
OUTCM - payoff in period t - 1, 
f-i-M, 
_ 0 if subject received the low 
payoff in period t -1. 
The coefficient on OUTCM,_1 for Group I 
in experiment 1 is just significant at the 10 
percent confidence level. All of the other 
columns of Table 9 report insignificant co- 
efficients on the previous period outcome 
variable. However, the one significant coef- 
ficient on OUTCM,_1 is negative, indicating 
that a lucky subject is less likely to choose 
the long shot ($) bet on the next choice. 
Table 10 reports similar estimations for indi- 
vidual decision pairs from both experiments. 
None of these coefficients on previous period 
outcome is significant at the 10 percent level. 
We conclude that previous period lottery 
outcome cannot account for the observed 
reversals. 
D. Analysis of Possible Framing Effects 
In the direct choice questions, the subjects 
were simply asked to indicate which one of 
two lotteries in a pair they would prefer to 
play. In the selling price questions, the sub- 
jects were asked to report selling prices for 
both lotteries in a pair. They would then 
play the lottery on which they had placed 
the higher price and sell the other to the 
experimenter for 1,000 francs. In addition, 
the payoffs for the lotteries in the selling 
price questions were uniformly lower by 
1,000 francs than the payoffs for the corre- 
sponding lotteries in the direct choice ques- 
tions. Thus the decision in a selling price 
question is exactly equivalent in economic 
terms to a choice between the lotteries in the 
corresponding direct choice question. The 
only difference is in the way the questions 
are "framed." Psychologists have extensively 
studied "framing effects" and concluded that 
they significantly affect subject responses in 
a variety of contexts (Slovic and Lichten- 
stein, 1983; Amos Tversky and Daniel Kah- 
neman, 1981). This leads us to ask whether 
the choice reversals in our experiments can 
be explained by systematic framing effects. 
For example. does framing the choice as a 
selling price question cause the subjects to 
more or less frequently choose the $ bet than 
does direct choice framing? Table 11 reports 
the $ and P bet choices for both experi- 
ments disaggregated by type of question. 
The nearly identical choices in the selling 
price and direct choice questions in experi- 
ment 1 do not reveal any framing effect. 
Subject responses to the direct choice ques- 
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TABLE 10-TESTS FOR PREVIOUS PERIOD OUTCOME FFECTS IN 
INDIVIDUAL DECISION PAIRS 
Subsamples 
Design Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair 
Determinants (1,7) (2,8) (3,9) (4,10) (5,11) (6,12) 
Experiment 1 
TWt,> 0.00004986 0.000003469 - 0.00004830 0.0001057 0.0000072820.00009371 
(1.018) (0.073) (-1.044) (1.785) (0.176) (1.360) 
OUTCM,_ -0.629345 -0.523611 -0.247884 -0.545925 -0.02418 -0.12346 
(-0.608) (-0.583) (-0.294) (-0.510) (-0.030) (-0.116) 
D,_- 6 0.362484 1.30338 0.987279 2.67356 0.437548 2.80971 
(0.418) (1.605) (1.147) (2.099) (0.528) (2.205) 
In L - 17.602 -18.621 -17.526 -13.021 - 19.553 -14.771 
- 2ln X 1.4475 3.8113 3.1386 6.5534 0.32290 7.1107 
2,0.95 7.81 7.81 7.81 7.81 7.81 7.81 X3 78 
N 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Experiment 2 
TW>-1 0.0000195 0.0000261 0.000126 -0.0000429 0.0000424 0.0000370 
(0.565) (0.986) (1.201) (-0.712) (1.102) (1.459) 
OUTCM,1 0.2454 0.5322 0.9245 -13.640 -0.1464 -0.7698 
(0.247) (0.615) (0.693) (-0.017) (-0.107) (-0.869) 
Dt,- 6 1.312 0.1447 2.986 2.550 0.9821 0.3312 
(1.436) (0.149) (1.856) (1.331) (1.073) (0.388) 
ln L -18.763 -18.189 -9.822 -4.546 -14.980 -16.747 
- 21n X 4.063 1.812 7.390 5.605 2.637 3.159 
2,0.95 7.81 7.81 7.81 7.81 7.81 7.81 X3' 
N 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Note: L, A, and N are defined in Table 4. Other notation in this table is defined in 
Table 7. 
TABLE 11-TEST FOR FRAMING EFFECTS 
Type of Number of Number of 
Question $ Bet Choices P Bet Choices 
Experiment 1 
Direct Choice 87 91 
Selling Price 86 93 
Experiment 2 
Direct Choice 89 91 
Selling Price 77 103 
tions in experiment 2 are essentially the same 
as in experiment 1. The only evidence of a 
possible framing effect in Table 11 is in the 
subject responses to the selling price ques- 
tions in experiment 2. Compared to the other 
rows of the table, the last row reports a 
greater proportion of P bet choices. But the 
experiment 1 figures in Table 11 show no 
effect of framing and this experiment has a 
higher percentage of reversals than does ex- 
periment 2. We conclude that systematic 
framing effects cannot explain the choice 
reversals in our experiments. 
VI. Interpretation of the Results 
We have found that neither wealth nor 
outcome nor framing effects can account for 
the choice reversals in our experiments. 
Hence the results of our experiments have 
implications for both the psychologists' an- 
choring and adjustment theory and for 
economists' rational decision theory. 
A. Implications for the Anchoring 
and Adjustment Theory 
In earlier preference reversal experiments, 
most reversals were of one type: subjects 
were much more likely to state a preference 
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for the P bet, and place a higher selling price 
on the $ bet, than to make the other type of 
reversal. In those experiments, very few of 
the subjects who chose the $ bet failed to 
order their prices consistently. Psychologists 
have used the anchoring and adjustment the- 
ory to explain why the one type of prefer- 
ence reversal that was commonly observed in 
earlier experiments was "expected" (that is, 
predicted by the theory) and the other type 
was not expected (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 
1983, p. 597). According to this theory, in 
choosing between two lotteries a subject first 
anchors on probabilities of winning and then 
makes an insufficient adjustment for differ- 
ences in payoffs. Furthermore, in deciding 
on selling prices a subject first anchors on 
payoffs and then makes an insufficient ad- 
justment for differences in probabilities. Thus 
the theory postulates that the "message 
space" or "response mode" substantially af- 
fects subject decisions. 
In our experiment 1, 45 percent of the 62 
reversals were of the previously common type 
while 55 percent were of the other variety. 
Similarly, in experiment 2 only 54 percent of 
the 52 reversals were the expected type. Thus 
we do not find the predicted asymmetry in 
the reversals despite the fact that we ask our 
subjects to make choices in one type of 
question and to state selling prices in the 
other. Furthermore, the pattern of the re- 
sponses reported in Table 11 does not sup- 
port anchoring and adjustment. The first two 
rows reveal no effect of the type of question 
on subjects' responses in experiment 1. The 
experiment 2 data reveal a greater tendency 
for the subjects to place higher selling prices 
on P bets than to choose them in response 
to direct choice questions. This is the oppo- 
site of the pattern of results that is consistent 
with anchoring on dollar payoffs in selling 
price questions and anchoring on probabili- 
ties in preference reporting questions. 
If the anchoring and adjustment theory is 
not to be contradicted by our results then 
there must be something that is essentially 
different about the way that we formulated 
our selling price questions that can be ex- 
plained by the theory. The explanation might 
be based on our conjecture that most of our 
subjects realized that the particular numbers 
they stated for prices were irrelevant except 
for their relative magnitudes. This was evi- 
denced by their comments and by their 
propensity to state prices such as 1,000 francs 
for lottery A and 999 francs for lottery B in 
any given (A, B) pair. However, if the an- 
choring and adjustment theory is to be im- 
munized to the apparent falsifying evidence 
of our experiments, it will have to be ex- 
tended to incorporate more than a message 
space explanation of choice reversals. 
B. Implications for Decision Theory 
As explained above, the results of the 
Grether-Plott (1979) experiments provide an 
empirical challenge to expected utility the- 
ory. However, the theoretical results of Holt, 
Karni and Safra, and Segal immunized more 
general decision theories to the results from 
the Grether-Plott experimental design by 
showing that it does not discriminate be- 
tween subject violations of the independence 
and compound lottery axioms and much 
more problematic violations of axioms such 
as transitivity. 
Our experiments were designed so that the 
independence and compound lottery axioms 
are not required to interpret the results. The 
results of our experiments differ dramatically 
from those reported by Grether and Plott 
and all of the other cited authors in that we 
do not find the pronounced asymmetry of 
the type of reversal that they reported. Taken 
together, the Grether and Plott results and 
our results are consistent with the hypothesis 
that subject violations of the independence 
axiom and/or the compound lottery axiom 
can account for the asymmetry in preference 
reversals that was observed in previous ex- 
periments. But that provides scarce comfort 
for decision theory because we observe about 
the same overall frequency of reversals 
(30-35 percent) as in previous research. Fur- 
thermore, the choice reversals in our experi- 
ments are violations of the asymmetry ax- 
iom, which is an axiom of decision theory 
that is even more fundamental than transi- 
tivity.9 
9Asymmetry is more fundamental than transitivity in 
that it is possible to develop a choice model that does 
not include the transitivity axiom (Sonnenschein, 1971). 
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VII. Perspective on the Results 
Grether and Plott (1979, p. 623) offered 
the following interpretation of the preference 
reversal phenomenon: 
Taken at face value the data are simply 
inconsistent with preference theory and 
have broad implications about research 
priorities within economics. The incon- 
sistency is deeper than the mere lack of 
transitivity or even stochastic transitiv- 
ity. It suggests that no optimization 
principles of any sort lie behind the sim- 
plest of human choices and that the uni- 
formities in human choice behavior which 
lie behind market behavior may result 
from principles which are of a completely 
different sort from those generally ac- 
cepted. 
Subsequently, Holt, Karni and Safra, and 
Segal effectively immunized various general- 
izations of expected utility theory to falsifi- 
cation by the Grether-Plott and other prefer- 
ence reversal experiments previous to the 
ones reported in our paper. But our experi- 
mental design does not require the indepen- 
dence and compound lottery axioms to in- 
terpret the results and we observe a high 
frequency of choice reversals that are known 
to be violations of the asymmetry axiom. 
Must one now accept the Grether-Plott in- 
terpretation of the preference reversal phe- 
nomenon? 
Results of individual choice experiments 
such as ours clearly have implications for the 
generality and applicability of economic the- 
ory. Experiments on preference reversal and 
Bayes' rule (David Grether, 1980, 1981) have 
consistently produced results that are incom- 
patible with accepted models of rational 
choice.'0 But what are the implications for 
theory? In contrast to the individual choice 
experiments, there is a large literature that 
has obtained results in market experiments 
that are generally consistent with the market 
allocation implications of individual choice 
theory (Vernon Smith, 1982, 1986). This pat- 
tern of results could have either of two, quite 
different implications. On the one hand, it 
may turn out that we do, indeed, need to 
develop fundamentally different approaches 
to decision theory in order to understand 
market behavior. On the other hand, it may 
be that our traditional models are incom- 
plete but not fundamentally flawed. Recall- 
ing the traditional "as if" interpretation of 
economic theory, it may be the case that the 
informational and disciplining properties of 
economic institutions cause real economic 
agents to learn to behave as if they are like 
our theoretical agents. Two related lines of 
research could provide the answer. One 
would consist of theoretical research on the 
process by which economic institutions mold 
the characteristics of agents. The other would 
consist of an experimental economics re- 
search program combining suitably paired 
nonmarket and market choice experiments. 
James Cox and Mark Isaac (1986) analyzed 
these questions at length and provided an 
outline of an experimental research program 
that could eventually provide empirical sup- 
port for either the "replace it" view of eco- 
nomic theory or the alternative "complete 
it" view. 
APPENDIX 
This Appendix contains the complete instructions 
(and the referenced Figure 0) given to the subjects in 
experiment 2. The instructions for experiment 1 were 
the same except for a reversal of the positions of the 
"win 8,000" and "lose 1,000" areas in Figure 0. The 
Appendix also contains two sample paired questions 
(Items 1 and 7) and the corresponding Figures 1 and 7. 
Each subject was asked 12 questions (Items 1-12) that 
alternated between selling price and direct choice ques- 
tions. The selling price and direct choice questions in 
each pair were separated by five intervening questions. 
Thus the sample Item 1 is the selling price question for 
lottery pair 1 in Table 2. The sample Item 7 is the direct 
choice question that is paired with Item 1. Complete 
copies of the instructions and all questions (Items 1-12) 
and figures used in both experiments are available upon 
request to the authors. 
INSTRUCTIONS 
The experimenters are trying to determine how peo- 
ple make decisions. We have designed a simple choice 
experiment, and we shall ask you to make decisions in 
each of several items. Each decision you shall make will 
involve two bets. When a bet is actually played, one ball 
1 A notable exception to this pattern is provided by 
the experiments by Cox and Ronald Oaxaca (1988) on 
search models. They found that a finite horizon (dy- 
namic-programming) search model generally predicted 
subject behavior quite accurately. 
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will be drawn from a bingo cage that contains 36 balls 
numbered 1-36. Depending upon the nature of the bet, 
the number drawn will determine whether you lose an 
amount of money or win an amount of money. Con- 
sider, as an example, the bet represented by Figure 0. If 
you play this bet, you will win 8,000 francs if the 
number drawn is less than or equal to 12, and you will 
lose 1,000 francs if the number drawn is greater than 12. 
For the purpose of this experiment, one U.S. dollar is 
equal to 4,000 francs. 
We are going to ask you to make two basic types of 
decisions regarding the bets which are presented. 
Decision Type I. When making this type of decision, 
you will be presented with two bets. Then you will be 
asked which bet you would prefer to play, and you will 
simply play the bet which you have selected immedi- 
ately following your choice. If you do not care which 
bet you play, merely indicate this in the space provided, 
and the bet you play will be determined by a coin toss. 
Decision Type II. When making this type of decision, 
you also will be presented with two bets. Then you will 
be asked to state the smallest price for which you would 
sell each of the bets. Once you have stated the two 
selling prices (one for each bet), we will pay you 1,000 
francs for the bet to which you have given the lower 
selling price. Then you will be allowed to play the bet to 
which you have given the higher selling price. If you 
state the same selling price for the two bets, the bet you 
sell to us will be determined by a coin toss. 
Further Explanation. To begin, we are giving you an 
endowment of 20,000 francs, or $5.00. If you were to 
lose each and every bet you play, you could lose $4.50. 
Therefore, if you should lose every bet, you will still 
have at least $.50. This amount is your minimum possi- 
ble payment for participating in this experiment. Your 
maximum possible payment for participation is $53.50. 
Do You Have Any Questions? 
Item 1: Consider carefully the two bets shown in 
Figure 1. 
What is the smallest price for which you would sell 
the opportunity to play each of these bets? We will then 
pay you 1,000 francs for the bet to which you have 
given the lower selling price, and you will play the bet 
to which you have given the higher selling price. If your 
two prices are the same, the bet you sell to us will be 
determined by a coin toss. 
Smallest Price for Bet A: Win/Loss 
Smallest Price for Bet B: + 1000 Fr. = 
Item 7: Consider carefully the two bets shown in 
Figure 7. 
You will have the opportunity to play one of these 
bets. Make one check below to indicate which bet you 
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BET A 











would prefer to play. Then you will play the bet you 
have selected. If you do not care which bet you play, the 
one you play will be determined by a coin toss. 
Bet A: 
Bet B: 
Do not Care: Win/Loss 
REFERENCES 
Becker, G. M., DeGroot, Morris H. and Marshak, 
Jacob, " Measuring Utility by a Single- 
Response Sequential Method," Behavioral 
Science, July 1964, 9, 226-32. 
Berg, Joyce E., Dickhaut, John W. and O'Brien, 
John R., "Preference Reversal and Arbi- 
trage," in Vernon L. Smith, ed., Research 
in Experimental Economics, Vol. 3, Green- 
wich: JAI Press, 1985. 
Chew, Soo Hong, "A Mixture Set Axiomatiza- 
tion of Weighted Utility Theory," unpub- 
lished manuscript, University of Arizona, 
Tucson, AZ, 1981. 
Cox, James C. and Isaac, R. Mark, " Experimen- 
tal Economics and Experimental Psychol- 
ogy: Ever the Twain Shall Meet?," in 
Alan J. MacFadyen and Heather W. 
MacFadyen, ed., Economic Psychology: 
Intersections in Theory and Application, 
New York: Elsevier Science, 1986. 
and Oaxaca, Ronald L., "Laboratory 
Experiments with a Finite Horizon Job 
Search Model," paper presented at the 
Fourth Experimental Economics Work- 
shop, Feb.-March 1986; revised April 
1988, forthcoming in the Journal of Risk 
and Uncertainty. 
Fishburn, Peter C., "Transitive Measurable 
Utility," Journal of Economic Theory, De- 
cember 1983, 31, 293-317. 
Grether, David M., " Bayes' Rule as a Descrip- 
tive Model: The Representativeness Heu- 
ristic," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
November 1980, 95, 537-57. 
, "Financial Incentive Effects and In- 
dividual Decision Making," Social Science 
Working Paper No. 401, California Insti- 
tute of Technology, Pasadena, CA, 1981. 
and Plott, Charles R., "Economic The- 
ory of Choice and the Preference Reversal 
Phenomenon," American Economic Re- 
view, September 1979, 69, 623-38. 
Holt, Charles A., "Preference Reversals and 
the Independence Axiom," American Eco- 
nomic Review, June 1986, 76, 508-14. 
Kami, Edi and Safra, Zvi, "Preference Rever- 
sal and the Observability of Preferences 
by Experimental Methods," Econometrica, 
May 1987, 55, 675-85. 
Lichtenstein, Sarah and Slovic, Paul, "Reversals 
of Preference Between Bids and Choices 
in Gambling Decisions," Journal of Exper- 
imental Psychology, January 1971, 89, 
46-55. 
and , "Response-Induced Re- 
versals of Preference in Gambling: An 
Extended Replication in Las Vegas," 
This content downloaded from 131.96.28.172 on Mon, 11 Jan 2016 19:02:27 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
426 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC RE VIEW JUNE 1989 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, Nov- 
ember 1973, 101, 16-20. 
Lindman, Harold R., "Inconsistent Preferences 
Among Gambles," Journal of Experimen- 
tal Psychology, May 1971, 89, 390-97. 
Machina, Mark J., "'Expected Utility' Analy- 
sis Without the Independence Axiom," 
Econometrica, March 1982, 50, 277-323. 
Pommerehne, Werner W., Schneider, Friedreich 
and Zweifel, Peter, "Economic Theory of 
Choice and the Preference Reversal Phe- 
nomenon: A Reexamination," American 
Economic Review, June 1982, 72, 569-74. 
Reilly, Robert J., "Preference Reversal: Fur- 
ther Evidence and Some Suggested Modi- 
fications in Experimental Design," Ameri- 
can Economic Review, June 1982, 72, 
576-84. 
Segal, Uzi, "Does the Preference Reversal 
Phenomenon Necessarily Contradict the 
Independence Axiom?," American Eco- 
nomic Review, March 1988, 78, 233-36. 
Slovic, Paul and Lichtenstein, Sarah, "Prefer- 
ence Reversals: A Broader Perspective," 
American Economic Review, September 
1983, 73, 596-605. 
Smith, Vernon L., " Microeconomic Systems as 
an Experimental Science," American Eco- 
nomic Review, December 1982, 72, 923-55. 
"Experimental Methods in the Po- 
litical Economy of Exchange," Science, 
October 1986, 234, 167-73. 
Sonnenschein, Hugo, "Demand Theory With- 
out Transitive Preferences, with Applica- 
tions to the Theory of Competitive Equi- 
librium," in John S. Chipman, L. Hurwicz, 
M. K. Richter, H. F. Sonnenschein, eds., 
Preferences, Utility, and Demand, New 
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971. 
Tversky, Amos and Kahneman, Daniel, "The 
Framing of Decisions and the Psychology 
of Choice," Science, January 1981, 211, 
453-58. 
Yaari, Menahem E., "The Dual Theory of 
Choice Under Risk," Econometrica, Jan- 
uary 1987, 55, 95-115. 
This content downloaded from 131.96.28.172 on Mon, 11 Jan 2016 19:02:27 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
